{"id":563922,"date":"2023-07-26T09:45:49","date_gmt":"2023-07-26T13:45:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.rochester.edu\/newscenter\/?p=563922"},"modified":"2023-08-11T11:44:35","modified_gmt":"2023-08-11T15:44:35","slug":"state-revenue-collection-divergence-gap-563922","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.rochester.edu\/newscenter\/state-revenue-collection-divergence-gap-563922\/","title":{"rendered":"Mind the revenue gap"},"content":{"rendered":"
In 2015, two political scientists at the 天美传媒<\/a> began assembling data to study the effects of colonialism on the ability of newly liberated states to collect revenues after independence.<\/p>\n Answering the question required information on former Western colonial powers as well as non-Western states, among them the former colonies. The scholars\u2014Alexander Lee<\/a>, an associate professor in Rochester\u2019s Department of Political Science<\/a>, and Jack Paine, now an associate professor of political science at Emory University\u2014amassed a trove of data from 18 Western countries and 76 non-Western countries, with data points spanning the 19th to the 21st century.<\/p>\n What they found was so surprising that they worried they\u2019d gotten it wrong. Their results ran counter to conventional wisdom.<\/p>\n \u201cWow,\u201d Lee remembers thinking.<\/p>\n Academic research on state revenues seems to have overgeneralized the example of Britain, which developed the capacity to efficiently collect revenues as early as the 1700s, and throughout the 19th century. Britain had a strong need to raise revenues during the Napoleonic Wars, from 1803 to 1815. Britain was also where industrialization first took root. Based on the British example, scholars generally assumed that Western European nations, also affected by the Napoleonic Wars, followed a similar path as they, too, underwent economic modernization.<\/p>\n But that seems to have been a mistake. Britain wasn\u2019t a trailblazer. Instead, it was an outlier. Existing studies showing an early European advantage in revenue collection are largely based on \u201clittle bits and pieces of revenue estimates with unrepresentative data points,\u201d says Paine.<\/p>\n The two scholars had stumbled on a previously overlooked empirical pattern in state revenue collection. As it turns out, as late as 1913 central governments in the West collected very similar levels of per capita revenue as the rest of the world\u2014notwithstanding the fact that many countries in Europe already had the necessary infrastructure in place that would have allowed for much greater revenue extraction.<\/p>\n \u201cPeople just implicitly assume that if European countries had the ability to raise taxes, they were probably doing it,\u201d says Paine.<\/p>\nData reveal an overlooked pattern<\/strong><\/h3>\n